Walter Buhle (26 October 1894 – 28 December 1959) was born in Heilbronn, Wuerttemberg, on October 26, 1894. He joined the Imperial Army as a Fahnenjunker on July 10, 1913, received his commission in August 1914 (just as World War I broke out), and served mainly with the Wuerttemberger 124th Infantry Regiment (27th Infantry Division) in Lorraine and the 122nd Fusilier Regiment (26th Infantry Division) on the Eastern Front. Severely wounded in June 1915, he recovered, underwent mortar training, and served with a mortar battalion for the rest of the war. After serving as a signals officer with the Reichsheer’s 13th Infantry Regiment at Ludwigsburg, Wuerttemberg (1921), he transferred to the Wuerttemberger 18th Cavalry Regiment, where he began his General Staff training. After attending the College for Politics in Berlin (1925–1926), Buhle worked in the Defense Ministry and Group Command 1 in Berlin (1926–1930). Promoted to captain in 1926, he commanded a company in the 13th Infantry Regiment from 1930 to late 1932, when he returned to the Defense Ministry and was assigned to the Organizations Department (T-2). Promoted to major in 1933 and lieutenant colonel in 1936, he commanded II/87th Infantry Regiment, a former provincial police unit in Aschaffenburg, northwest Bavaria, from October 1936 to October 1937. He was Ia of Wehrkreis V at Stuttgart from October 1937 to November 1938, when he was posted to the army General Staff. He was promoted to full colonel in early 1939 and, in recognition of his knowledge and technical expertise in the field of armaments, he was named head of the Organizations Section of OKH five days before World War II began. A convinced Nazi, Buhle was rewarded for his loyalty and hard work by promotion to major general in 1940 and to lieutenant general in 1942.
Buhle was given greater responsibility when he was assigned to the post of chief of the army staff at OKW in January 1942. He was disliked by other generals, for he meddled in everything and was a trusted informant for Hitler. General Warlimont noticed his personality flaws and wrote that Buhle bypassed Keitel (the chief of OKW and his direct superior) and established a direct, personal relationship with Hitler.
Buhle’s isolation at Fuehrer Headquarters, along with his propensity for offering a view on all matters (his “meddling”) was apparent at a Fuehrer conference on July 25, 1943. The conference centered on the Italian situation, which had deteriorated, as Mussolini had been removed from power the previous day, and the German situation in the Mediterranean was potentially desperate. Hitler was discussing the situation with Jodl and Keitel when Buhle interjected that Italy must be given top priority for all transport vehicles. He even insisted that everything on the assembly line or on the way to the East should be sent to the German troops in the Rome area. He made this recommendation at a time when army groups Center and South were fighting the largest armored battle in history at Kursk and needed all the vehicles they could possibly get to supply and reinforce their regiments.
Buhle, in charge of army transport, fumed at the generals who always demanded more and, Buhle believed, interfered with his allocation plans. In December 1943, for example, Buhle complained during a Fuehrer briefing that he could assure that there would be adequate tank battalions in the West, provided no one took them away. “No sooner have I got something together,” he went on, “than it’s gone.” Hitler angrily asked if Buhle was referring to him, which of course he was not. His remark was aimed at Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler, who had replaced Halder as the chief of OKH in September 1942.
This type of criticism of OKH by Buhle and others contributed to Hitler’s declining confidence in General Zeitzler. On the other hand, Hitler demonstrated his faith in Buhle by promoting him to general of infantry on April 1, 1944. The Fuehrer wanted to make him chief of the General Staff in place of Zeitzler later that year; however, Buhle was severely wounded by the July 20 explosion at Hitler’s headquarters and was in the hospital for some time. He did not fully recover for weeks after that. Ironically enough, the would-be assassin was Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenberg, a talented General Staff officer who had been one of Buhle’s principal assistants in the Organizations Branch from 1940 to 1942. After some initial friction the two had worked well together, although the aristocratic Stauffenberg commented at the time that Buhle was “not altogether” a gentleman.
In January 1945, Hitler chose Buhle to replace Emil von Leeb as head of the Army Weapons Office (i.e., chief of armaments for the army). Buhle did his best to supply the German field forces, but the combination of Allied bombing and lack of labor made his task nearly impossible. Nonetheless, he gave it his best effort. It is interesting to note that it was Buhle who by chance found Admiral Wilhelm Canaris’s diaries, which clearly indicated that the former chief of the Abwehr had been in contact with the anti-Hitler conspirators of July 20. Ever the pro-Hitler informer, Buhle handed the evidence over to the Gestapo. As a result the admiral was stripped naked, taken out, and hanged by the SS on April 9, 1945.
General Buhle survived the war and the subsequent trials. Released from Allied captivity in 1947, he retired to Stuttgart, where he died on December 28, 1959.
Buhle was given greater responsibility when he was assigned to the post of chief of the army staff at OKW in January 1942. He was disliked by other generals, for he meddled in everything and was a trusted informant for Hitler. General Warlimont noticed his personality flaws and wrote that Buhle bypassed Keitel (the chief of OKW and his direct superior) and established a direct, personal relationship with Hitler.
Buhle’s isolation at Fuehrer Headquarters, along with his propensity for offering a view on all matters (his “meddling”) was apparent at a Fuehrer conference on July 25, 1943. The conference centered on the Italian situation, which had deteriorated, as Mussolini had been removed from power the previous day, and the German situation in the Mediterranean was potentially desperate. Hitler was discussing the situation with Jodl and Keitel when Buhle interjected that Italy must be given top priority for all transport vehicles. He even insisted that everything on the assembly line or on the way to the East should be sent to the German troops in the Rome area. He made this recommendation at a time when army groups Center and South were fighting the largest armored battle in history at Kursk and needed all the vehicles they could possibly get to supply and reinforce their regiments.
Buhle, in charge of army transport, fumed at the generals who always demanded more and, Buhle believed, interfered with his allocation plans. In December 1943, for example, Buhle complained during a Fuehrer briefing that he could assure that there would be adequate tank battalions in the West, provided no one took them away. “No sooner have I got something together,” he went on, “than it’s gone.” Hitler angrily asked if Buhle was referring to him, which of course he was not. His remark was aimed at Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler, who had replaced Halder as the chief of OKH in September 1942.
This type of criticism of OKH by Buhle and others contributed to Hitler’s declining confidence in General Zeitzler. On the other hand, Hitler demonstrated his faith in Buhle by promoting him to general of infantry on April 1, 1944. The Fuehrer wanted to make him chief of the General Staff in place of Zeitzler later that year; however, Buhle was severely wounded by the July 20 explosion at Hitler’s headquarters and was in the hospital for some time. He did not fully recover for weeks after that. Ironically enough, the would-be assassin was Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenberg, a talented General Staff officer who had been one of Buhle’s principal assistants in the Organizations Branch from 1940 to 1942. After some initial friction the two had worked well together, although the aristocratic Stauffenberg commented at the time that Buhle was “not altogether” a gentleman.
In January 1945, Hitler chose Buhle to replace Emil von Leeb as head of the Army Weapons Office (i.e., chief of armaments for the army). Buhle did his best to supply the German field forces, but the combination of Allied bombing and lack of labor made his task nearly impossible. Nonetheless, he gave it his best effort. It is interesting to note that it was Buhle who by chance found Admiral Wilhelm Canaris’s diaries, which clearly indicated that the former chief of the Abwehr had been in contact with the anti-Hitler conspirators of July 20. Ever the pro-Hitler informer, Buhle handed the evidence over to the Gestapo. As a result the admiral was stripped naked, taken out, and hanged by the SS on April 9, 1945.
General Buhle survived the war and the subsequent trials. Released from Allied captivity in 1947, he retired to Stuttgart, where he died on December 28, 1959.
Source :
"Hitler's Commanders" by Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr. and Gene Mueller
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walther_Buhle
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